This paper studies the effect of population aging on economic performance in an overlapping-generations model with international migration. We find that introducing immigrants into the economy can reduce the tax burden of social security. If life expectancy (or the replacement ratio) is high enough, the growth rate for an open economy with international migration will be higher than for a closed economy.
INTRODUCTION
Over the past century longevity has steadily increased in countries which have experienced economic growth. The upward trend of life expectancy in Canada, France, Japan, the United Kingdom and the U.S.A. during the period from 1980 to 2005 is presented in Figure 1a . One implication of longevity growth is that more resources must be devoted to supporting the elderly, and governments have often raised social security expenditures. Figure 1b shows that the ratio of pension expenditure to GDP increased along with life expectancy in Canada, France, Japan, United Kingdom and U.S.A. over the period from 1980 to2005. 1 However, for most industrialized countries a decline in mortality is accompanied by a reduction in fertility over the course of development. The graying of many countries' populations has led many to worry about the future tax burden of social security. In short, the concern is that expenditures on old-age entitlements will continue to grow even as there are fewer young people available to contribute to the tax base.
There is a huge amount of literature devoted to the increasing social security burden caused by aging populations and possible solutions to this problem. These studies can be classified into two categories. The first line of research studies the issue in a closed economy and focuses on the sustainability of a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system or on possible reforms to the social security system. The interaction of public investment in education, social security and growth for a closed economy is investigated by Kaganovich and Zilcha (1999) and Pecchenino and Pollard (2002) . Based on a two-sector growth model, Zhang et al. (2001) compare the effects of mortality decline on long-run growth under funded and unfunded social security schemes.
Recently, Groezen et al. (2003) and Fenge and Meier (2005) suggest that the burden of social security can be mitigated by using child allowances. With child allowances, the cost of raising children becomes lower and parents will have stronger incentives to have more children. However, this view is challenged by Mochida (2005) who argues that when uncertain lifetime is incorporated into the model, introducing child allowances does not necessarily increase fertility because it may induce a higher tax rate. With lower after-tax income and increasing life expectancy, adults may choose to work more and have fewer children in order to save more for their post-retirement consumption.
The second category of previous research considers the problem of increasing social security burden in an open economy. This research demonstrates that introducing immigrants can alleviate the increasing burden of social security for developed countries. Razin and Sadka (1999) show that even introducing low-skilled immigrants who are often beneficiaries of the welfare state into an economy can be beneficial to all income and all age groups. With a dynamic set-up, adult immigrants share the burden of social security with natives upon their migration into the host country. Although these immigrants will create a new welfare burden in the future, the burden will be shared by newly introduced immigrants as long as the economy is ever-lasting. By using the data from Current Population Survey (CPS) and Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS), Lee and Miller (2000) project the fiscal impact of immigrants and their descendents. They find that the net present value contributed by an immigrant is always positive to the Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI).
In this paper, we follow the second line of research to revisit the issue of an increasing social security burden in an open economy. Besides examining the impact of introducing immigrants on the tax burden of a social security program, we also explore immigration's effects on key macroeconomic variables such as fertility, educational investment and economic growth. There are two major differences between this paper and existing research. First, while previous literature tends to treat fertility as an exogenous variable, fertility decisions are endogenized in this paper.
2 It is now well-known that parents' decisions about fertility and the educational investments of their offspring are interdependent (Becker et al., 1990) .
3 Ehrlich and Lui (1991) demonstrate that if old agents are dependent on their offspring for material support, a decline in the mortality will raise parents' expected rate of investment in the human capital of their children and induce a corresponding reduction in fertility (the quality-quantity trade-off of children). The increase in the educational investment will in turn raise the long-run growth rate.
Secondly, we assume that the level of immigrants' human capital can be different from that of natives. Different levels of human capital cause immigrants and natives to make different choices about fertility and investment in their children's education.
This change in human capital accumulation will then affect economic growth.
Furthermore, fertility matters when considering an economy with heterogeneous agents, because it will also affect the future population structure and labor force. Both population structure and labor force are important determinants of the burden of social security.
We develop an overlapping-generations model of social security within which adults make decisions about consumption, fertility and investment in their children's education. In order to compare the impact of longevity in an open economy with that in a closed economy, we first consider a simple, closed economy with a PAYG social security program. 4 We show that a balanced-growth-path (BGP) equilibrium exists in such an economy. An increase in life expectancy will increase the tax rate necessary for social security and reduce after-tax income. Reduced after-tax income will cause adults to have fewer children (income effect). On the other hand, the lower after-tax wage rate will also reduce the time cost of raising children and will motivate adults to have more children (substitution effect). We find that the income effect will dominate the substitution effect and an increase in life expectancy will reduce fertility and investment in children's education. This will slow economic growth. On the other hand, longer life expectancy will induce more savings which increases economic growth. If life expectancy is high enough, the former effect will dominate the latter, and increased life expectancy will retard economic growth. We also find that an increase in social security payments will raise fertility and decrease educational expenditure if the degree of altruism is sufficiently low. Hence, under this condition an increase in the social security payment will lower economic growth.
Next, we consider an open economy with international immigrants. In order to study the impact of migration policy regarding the quality of immigrants, we assume that immigrants possess a different level of human capital from natives. Our consideration of the heterogeneity among immigrants and natives is closely related to Storesletten (2000) .
The characteristics of immigrants are emphasized in Storesletten (2000) by assuming that immigrants are differentiated in age at the time of immigration and by their legal status. In his study, however, fertility and investment in children's education are not endogenous.
The existence of heterogeneous agents makes the model more complicated, so we simulate the model and present numerical results for an open economy. We find that introducing immigrants into the economy can lower the social security tax rate. If life studies social security payments are treated as endogenous variables. The impact of choices of fertility and educational investment on the future social security payments are taken into consideration when parents make their decisions on the quality and quantity of children. In this paper, we follow Kaganovich and Zilcha (1999) and Groezen et al. (2003) by assuming that social security payment is treated as an exogenous variable when adults make optimal decisions. expectancy (or the replacement ratio) is high enough, the growth rate for an open economy will be higher than for a closed economy, provided that the gap of human capital between immigrants and high-skilled natives is not large and the flow of immigrants is small. We also study the impact of migration policies by changing the quantity and quality of immigrants. Our numerical results show that the economic growth rate will first decrease and then increase as more workers are allowed to migrate into the host country. On the other hand, increasing the quality of immigrants will enhance economic growth.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section we describe the basic settings of our model in a closed economy with a PAYG social security scheme. In Section 3, we develop an open economy with international migration. In Section 4, we carry out numerical analysis to determine the effects of longevity, social security payments and migration policies on economic performance both for a closed and for an open economy. The conclusions drawn from this study are presented in the final section.
THE MODEL
As a benchmark, we first examine social security in a closed economy comprised of homogeneous agents. We consider an infinite-horizon, discrete time overlappinggenerations model within which agents live for three periods -childhood, adulthood (parenting) and old age. Agents always survive from childhood to adulthood, but their survival from adulthood to old age is uncertain. Each period covers approximately 30 years.
All decisions are made in adulthood, with adults deciding how many children they will have, how much to invest in their children's education, how much to consume, and how much they should save for their old age. When making such decisions, these 7 adults face an uncertain probability (
) of survival from adulthood to old age.
There is a PAYG social security system implemented in this economy. In each period, the government levies a tax on adult wage income and transfers the tax revenue to the surviving old agents. Old agents do not work and consume their savings from the previous period, the returns from mutual funds, and social security benefits.
Households
Children born in period t are endowed with parental human capital ( t h ), and they spend all of their time accumulating additional human capital. The human capital accumulation function depends on the educational investment made by their parents
( t e ) and parental human capital ( t h ), and is given by: 
where the parameter 0 > σ reflects the degree of altruism amongst parents, and p represents the probability that adults will survive to old age.
In each period, agents are endowed with one unit of time. They spend t l units of 5
The Cobb-Douglas formation of the human capital accumulation function has been widely used in the literature on human capital; see, for example, Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) . time on work to earn wages ( t w ) and the rest of time on raising children. We assume that each child consumes a fixed fraction (
) of their parent's unit of time.
Hence, the time constraint for adults is:
Adults pay income tax with rate t τ to the government and spend the after-tax income on consumption, investments in children's education, and savings ( t s ). The budget constraint for adults is:
Following Yarri (1965) and Blanchard (1985) , we assume that each adult's savings are deposited into mutual funds, which are invested in the capital market. Let
denote the gross rate of return in the capital market; then the gross rate of return for those surviving to old age is:
The budget constraint for an old agent is therefore:
where 1 + t M denotes the social security transfer in period 1 + t . As we will see later, our economy will generate endogenous growth. Therefore, we assume that the level of social security benefits is a fraction (replacement ratio a ) of the current labor income of adults. That is,
Combining Eqs. (4) and (5) gives us the inter-temporal budget constraint:
Government taxes labor incomes to finance social security. Let t N denote the 6 Similar setting of social security benefits can be found in Pecchenino and Pollard (2002) .
adult population in period t . The budget constraint for the government in period 1 + t is:
Production
Using physical capital ( t K ) and effective labor (
by the following production function:
where 0 > A represents the total factor productivity and
is the share of physical capital income to the output.
Assuming perfectly competitive factor markets, the gross rate of the return on physical capital and the real wage rates are:
denote the physical capital per worker. Then the output per worker and (
The Economy
We are now able to define the equilibrium of the economy. Given the probability of survival ( p ), the replacement ratio ( a ), the initial values of physical and human capital M is determined by Eq (6). Government runs the public pension system as a PAYG-scheme with the balanced budget constraint (Eq. (8) 
holds).
Adults will maximize Eq. (2), subject to Eqs. (1), (3) and (7). The optimal choices of t c ,
n and t e are:
The capital market clearing condition implies that:
Substituting Eq. (6) into Eq. (8), we can derive that:
Eq. (18) shows that the tax rate needs to be adjusted in every period in order to keep the amount of social security benefit to be proportional to the adults' wage income. It also indicates that the higher fertility rate in the current period can help mitigate the tax burden for the social security in the next period.
Combining Eqs. (8), (10), (11) and (17), we can express the social security payments as: 7 We assume that physical capital completely depreciates after one period (30 years).
Substituting Eq. (19) into Eqs. (5) and (13)- (15), the optimal decisions on savings and fertility are:
In Appendix 1, we show that fertility is constant over time. Then Eqs. (3) and (18) indicate that labor input and tax rate are also constant. That is, n n t = , l l t = , τ τ = t for all t . In the following proposition, we prove that a unique BGP equilibrium exists in the economy. [ ]
Proof: See Appendix 1.
We concentrate our study on the BGP equilibrium. Define (3) and (16), we can derive a constant t φ as:
In the following Proposition, we examine the impacts of social security reform (that is, changes in the replacement ratio) on the fertility rate, the ratio of educational expenditure to labor income, and the growth factor.
Proposition 2.
If θ θ σ − < 1 , a rise in the replacement ratio will increase fertility and reduce the ratio of educational expenditure to labor income (a qualityquantity trade-off of children). Then the growth factor will decrease with an increase in the replacement ratio.
Proof:
See Appendix 2.
If the government raises the replacement ratio, the social security tax rate will be higher (Eq. (18)). The increase in the tax burden of social security will cause an income effect and a substitution effect. The lower after-tax labor income will motivate adults to work more and have fewer children (income effect). Due to the lower aftertax wage rate, the opportunity cost of raising children become lower and adults will work less and spend more time raising children (substitution effect). If the degree of altruism among parents is low enough, the substitution effect will dominate the income effect, and adults will have more children and invest less in each child's education.
8
The lower educational investment will slow the accumulation of human capital. Thus, an increase in the replacement ratio will decrease the rate of economic growth.
Next, we consider the effects of life expectancy on economic performance.
Proposition 3. An increase in life expectancy will reduce both fertility and the ratio of education expenditure to labor income. If life expectancy is high enough, increase in life expectancy will slow economic growth.
Proof:
See Appendix 3.
An increase in life expectancy will increase the incentive for adults to save.
Moreover, when life expectancy increases the social security tax must increase to finance the increasing social security expenditure. The income effect caused by the 8 Our result is different from Zhang and Zhang (2004) since we do not consider bequests. If bequests are included in the model, an increase in the replacement ratio will have ambiguous impacts on fertility.
increasing tax rate will dominate the substitution effect and fertility will decrease.
Because of the increase in the incentive to save and the decrease in after-tax income, parents will invest less in each child's education and the ratio of educational expenditure to labor income will decrease. This will slow economic growth. On the other hand, savings themselves are beneficial to physical capital accumulation and therefore growth. The impact of life expectancy on growth depends on which effect dominates. If life expectancy is high enough, the effect of lower human capital accumulation will dominate the effect of higher physical capital accumulation due to the diminishing returns of physical capital. Then an increase in life expectancy will lower the economic growth rate. In Appendix 3, we show that this critical value of life
Using parameter values calibrated in the next section, the implications of Proposition 3 are shown in Figure 2 . When life expectancy increases from 0.2 to 1, the tax rate will increase while fertility and the ratio of educational investment to labor income will decrease. Furthermore, as life expectancy increases, the growth rate will first increase and then decrease.
AN OPEN ECONOMY WITH INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION
In this section, we consider an open economy with international migration. In order to incorporate the difference in productivity between immigrants and natives in our model, we allow the level of human capital of immigrants to be different from the natives. We assume that before period one, the economy, comprised by homogenous agents with human capital 
. The dynamics of respective ratios of type-1 and 2 workers to the total population of workers follow:
The average human capital in period t is:
Let i t l denote working time for type-i workers. Then the effective labor in period t is:
For each type of adults, they will maximize Eq. (2), subject to Eqs. (1), (3) and (7) based on their human capital. Given the human capital of each type agents ( 
All surviving old agents will receive the same social security payments proportional to the average wage income. That is:
) ( 
The balanced budget constraint for the government is:
Eq. (28) together with Eq. (29) determine the tax rate:
The optimal fertility choices for type-1 and 2 adults can be solved by using Eqs.
(5), (10), (11), (27) and (29):
[ ]
Notice that
Eq. (33) implies that 2 1 t t n n ≤ if and only if 1 ≤ δ and vice versa. Because for parents with low human capital, the time cost of raising children is lower, then they will tend to have more children than those with high human capital
NUMERICAL EXPERIMENT
Due to the complexity of the model, in this section we simulate our model in order to quantify the influence of migration on economic performance. Before proceeding with our computational work, we calibrate the parameters used in the model to match U.S. data. The calibration of parameter values is based upon economic performance along the BGP under a closed economy. All of the following calibrated parameter values are referred to as benchmark model parameter values.
Calibration
We begin by calibrating the parameter values of human capital accumulation function and production function. The results of the empirical study by Johnson and Stafford (1973) demonstrate that income elasticity for education expenditure is 0.198, while the figure used by Fernandez and Rogerson (1997) is 0.2 (based upon the estimates of Card and Krueger, 1992) . Since the figures provided by these studies are virtually identical, we also set α equal to 0.2. The share of physical capital income to the output (θ ) is set to 0.3. The parameters A and B are set at 3 so that the annual growth rate is 2%. The initial value of human capital is 1 and the initial value of physical capital is chosen so that the initial value of physical capital-human capital ratio equals its value along the BGP equilibrium. Haveman and Wolfe (1995) suggest that raising a child will cost approximately 15 percent of parents' time endowment. Hence, q is assigned to 0.15. The total fertility rate of U.S. in recent years is about 2 children per woman, so we choose the degree of altruism σ used in the utility function to be 0.35 in order to make the representative agent have about 1 child per person. In 2005, life expectancy is 78 years in U.S. Since one period equals 30 years in this model, we set p =0.6 to replicate the actual circumstance.
The remaining parameter to be calibrated for is the replacement ratio. Based on Pecchenino and Pollard (2002), we set the replacement ratio ( a ) to 0.4. Given these benchmark model parameter values, the annual growth rate is 2.0508%, the fertility rate is 1.0704, the ratio of educational investment to labor income is 3.4656% and the tax rate is 22.4218% along the BGP equilibrium for a closed economy.
When an economy opens for international migration, there are two important parameters regarding the quality and quantity of immigrants to be considered.
Comparing the years of education of natives and immigrants of USA, Borjas (1993) finds that on average, immigrants have 11.859 years of schooling which is 0.8 years fewer than natives. Therefore, the parameter δ is set to 0.9 (that is, the migrants are low-skilled workers). We first assign % 2 = μ so that the number of migrants is only a small fraction of the indigenous adult population. The assumption that the economy opens for international migration in the first period implies that 98 . 0 1
Given that our main goal is to study the influence of the migration, we will conduct sensitivity analysis on δ and μ .
Results
We begin our analysis by comparing the effects of life expectancy on long-run (tenth period) economic performance between a closed economy and an open economy with international migration. Details of the long-run (tenth period) impact of migration on average fertility, average ratio of educational expenditure to labor income, tax rate and the annual growth rate under a closed economy and an open economy are presented in Table 1 , with columns 2 and 3 providing the simulation results under benchmark model parameter values. Comparing these two columns, we find that a small amount of immigrants can have significant effects since introducing immigration can lower the tax rate by 1.84% and fertility by 0.13% and increase the ratio of educational investment to labor income by 0.5%. The growth rate is reduced by 0.23% due to the introduction of low-skilled immigrants, <Table 1 is inserted about here>
The effects of raising longevity from 0.2 (life expectancy is 66 years) to 1 (life expectancy is 90 years) on economic performance are shown in Figure 2 . It shows that with an increase in longevity, the social security burden becomes heavier and the aftertax income decreases. Hence, adults will spend more time on work and both educational expenditure and fertility will fall. Comparing the tax rate in an open economy with that in a closed economy, we find that introducing immigration will lower the social security tax rate and the spread of the tax rate widens as the life expectancy goes up. Columns 4 and 5 of However, the growth rate in an open economy will be higher if life expectancy is high enough, provided that the gap of human capital between immigrants and high-skilled natives is not too large, and the flow of immigrants is small.
Next, we consider the effects of changes in the replacement ratio. The results are shown in Figure 3 . As the replacement ratio increases, the tax rate will increase while fertility will decrease as demonstrated in Proposition 2. Due to the quality-quantity trade-off in children, educational expenditure will decrease and this will in turn lower the growth rate. Comparing the economic performance of an open economy with a closed economy, we find that the introduction of immigrants can help reduce the tax burden, with a larger effect as the replacement ratio increases. The average fertility is lower and the average ratio of educational investment to labor income is higher in an open economy than in a closed economy. The growth rate of an open economy is lower than that of a closed economy when the replacement ratio is small due to the lower level of immigrants' human capital. However, if the replacement ratio is large enough, the growth rate for an open economy will be higher because of higher educational investments. The last two columns of Table 1 
3 Migration Policy
In the previous section we show that introducing immigrants can have macroeconomic effects. In this section, we examine the impact of migration policy by changing the quality and quantity of immigrants. We first increase μ from 0.02 to 0.18 to study how it affects the economic performance.
<Figure 4 is inserted about here> Figure 4a indicates that when the government introduces more immigrants into the economy (an increase in μ ), there will be more workers sharing the social security burden and the tax rate will become lower. Figure 4b presents fertility and the ratio of educational investment to labor income for different types of agents in an open economy and for agents in a closed economy. With a higher after-tax wage rate, the opportunity cost of rearing children becomes higher, so for both types of agents the fertility rate declines and the ratio of educational expenditure to labor income increases with an increase in μ . Thus, the average fertility will decrease while the average ratio of educational expenditure to labor income will increase.
Changes in μ will affect the economic growth through two channels. On one hand, the increase in μ will raise the proportion of educational investment to labor income. On the other hand, an increase in μ implies an increase in the proportion of low-skilled adults to the total adult population, and this lowers the average human capital. Our numerical results show that if μ is small, the latter will dominate the former and the economic growth rate will decrease with an increase in the flow of immigrants. However, the situation will be reversed is μ is sufficiently large.
Proposition 6. A rise in the flow of low-skilled immigrants will lower the social security tax rate. It will reduce the average fertility and raise the average ratio of educational expenditure to labor income. The relationship between economic growth rate and flow of immigrants exhibits a Ushape.
In our baseline model, we assume that immigrants have a lower level of human capital than natives. We now allow δ to vary from 0.5 to 1.3 to examine how the level of human capital of immigrations affects economic performance. The results are presented in Figure 5 . Changes in δ will affect fertility in two ways. When immigrants (as well as the type-2 agents) are better-educated, they will choose to have fewer children (direct effect). However, changes in δ will also affect the fertility choice for type-1 agents as indicated by Eq. (31) (indirect effect). This is because as type-2 agents become better-educated, their labor income will increase and they will save more. Both investment and the average human capital will increase, so economic growth will increase. This will raise the future social security payments and the expected life-time income for type-1 agents. Thus, the fertility for type-1 agents will increase with an increase in δ as exhibited in Figure 5b . Figure 5a shows that when 1 < δ (immigrants are low-skilled workers), the direct effect dominates the indirect effect and the average fertility decreases as δ increases.
Hence, there will be fewer young people sharing the social security burden in the next generation, and the tax rate will increase with δ . Because of lower after-tax income, the average ratio of educational investment to labor income will decrease. Although the decrease in educational expenditure will retard economic growth, more educated immigrants will raise average human capital and will increase economic growth. Our numerical exercise indicates that the economic growth will increase with δ . ), an increase in δ will raise the average fertility and the average ratio of educational expenditure to labor income and will lower the tax rate. Both increases in φ and average human capital increase growth.
Hence, economic growth will increase as δ increases. We summarize our findings in the Proposition 7.
Proposition 7. If immigrants are low-skilled workers, an increase in the level of human capital of immigrants will reduce the average fertility and the average ratio of educational investment to labor income and will increase the tax rate. The situation will be reversed if immigrants are high-skilled workers. However, no matter which type immigrants are, an increase in the level of human capital of immigrants tends to increase the economic growth rate.
CONCLUSIONS
This study presents an analysis of the impact of introducing immigration on economic performance in an overlapping-generations model with uncertain lifetime and a social security system. Our analysis shows that introducing immigrants into the economy can help reduce the social security burden. If the gap inhuman capital between immigrants and natives is not too large and the flow of immigrants is small, the growth rate in an open economy will be higher than that in a closed economy when life expectancy (or the replacement ratio) is sufficiently high.
Concerning migration polices, we find that there is a U-shape relationship between the economic growth rate and the flow of immigrants. Although increasing the flow of immigrants can reduce the tax burden of social security, it is not necessary good for economic growth. On the other hand, increasing the quality of immigrants is beneficial for economic growth, but it raises the tax burden of social security if immigrants are low-skilled workers.
We conclude by suggesting two possible directions in which our model can be easily extended and applied. First, we assume that all immigrants can stay in the host country permanently. It would be interesting to extend the model to study the effects of temporary immigrants. Secondly, our model ignores the social costs of introducing immigrants such as cultural conflict. Adding such costs may reduce economic growth and social welfare.
Proof of Proposition 1
We first prove that there exists a unique equilibrium. Substituting Eq. (18) into Eq. (21),
we have:
The optimal solution(s) of fertility can be calculated by solving 0 ) ( = t n f . Note that:
is a quadratic function, 0 > Δ indicates that there exist two real
. Furthermore, the product of these two solutions is negative.
This implies that there exists a unique positive, constant solution of t n ( n n t = t ∀ ).
Then from Eqs. (3) and (18), we know that labor input and the tax rate are also constant ( l l t = , τ τ = t t ∀ ). Substituting the constant fertility rate and tax rate into Eqs. (13), (14), (16), (19) and (20) We next show the existence of balanced growth path. Along the BGP equilibrium, 
Combining Eqs. (11), (17), (20) and (21), we can calculate:
Using the property that Eqs. (A2) and (A3) are equal, the stationary variable
Substituting Eq. (A4) into Eq. (A2) gives us the growth factor:
QED.
Proof of Proposition 2
From Eq. (A1), we can derive the impact of the replacement ratio on fertility:
From Eq. (22), we can derive the impact of the replacement ratio on φ :
Using Eqs. (18), (21) and (A6), we know that
Note that the inequality (A7) holds if θ θ σ
The derivative of the growth factor respect to the replacement ratio is:
where
if the inequality (A7) holds.
Combining with the fact that 0 > ∂ ∂ a τ , we have that 0
Proof of Proposition 3
From Eq. (A1), we can derive the impact of p on fertility: 
The partial derivative of the growth factor respect to the replacement ratio is:
where 
